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TRACEABILITY AND TROUBLESHOOTING IN WIRELESS CLUSTER 
DEPLOYMENTS USING PROVENANCE METADATA AND HYPER LEDGER 
 
AUTHORS:   




Techniques are described herein for enhancing traceability and troubleshooting in 
complex enterprise wireless cluster deployments using provenance metadata and a hyper 
ledger. State and event information are captured and used to reconstruct/recreate state 
machines and event diagrams (e.g., using Unified Modeling Language (UML)) which may 
be directly mapped to the code. The states and events of all Wireless Local Area Network 
(LAN) Controllers (WLCs) in the cluster are maintained as provenance metadata. 
Provenance metadata may improve troubleshooting abnormalities/issues caused by an 
event or state change (positive provenance), and may help in debugging issues caused by 
missing events (negative provenance). The metadata is maintained as a transaction in the 
hyper ledger of a private blockchain, which may help in troubleshooting incidents caused 
by attacks (e.g., repudiation attacks, etc.). The transaction records are signed by the source 
to provide authenticity of the information that is especially required in the absence of a 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Enterprise wireless clustering deployments comprise clusters/groups of Wireless 
Area Network (LAN) Controllers (WLCs), intended to provide collaborative services such 
as load balancing of Access Points (APs), distributed multicast Domain Name System 
(mDNS) gateways, etc. A cluster may comprise WLCs with respective roles as leader 
(master) and worker (member). One of the WLCs in the cluster is elected Leader using a 
consensus algorithm. The leader is the point of contact for all configurations, image 
management, load balancing (distribution) of APs among worker WLCs, providing 
management plane activities such as show commands, assurance data, etc. 
These cluster deployments may be large (e.g., they may include three to ten, or even 
more, WLCs), and as such it can be difficult to detect faults therein. Debugging in such 
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complex wireless cluster deployments poses great challenges as the state of the system 
continuously changes due to the occurrences of various events (e.g., worker WLC 
connects/disconnects to/from the leader WLC, High Availability (HA) switchover of the 
leader/worker WLC, load balancing of APs based on different criteria such as site tag, 
Radio Resource Management (RRM) neighbor, round robin methods, etc.) and network 
issues (e.g., link up/down, port up/down, gateway unreachable, etc.). Sometimes the cluster 
deployments are distributed in nature (e.g., virtual WLCs, cloud deployment, etc.), and 
identifying faults in those deployments is particularly complex. The faults are often partial, 
irregular, and may result in abnormal behavior rather than system failure. Diagnosing a 
problem in such systems requires collecting relevant information from all WLCs in the 
cluster and correlating those with the problem. 
Today, it is required to manually debug from the logs generated locally and/or from 
the remote syslog server, even for simple issues (e.g., WLC is not reachable, a worker 
WLC is not connecting to the leader WLC, APs are not load balanced properly among 
worker WLCs, etc.). For local debugging, all the WLCs in the cluster (and/or APs) may 
need to be accessed (e.g., via console, Secure Shell (SSH), Telnet, etc.). For debugging 
using remote syslog, it may be necessary to sift through every log from all the WLCs 
configured with the same syslog server. These logs/debugs do not enable troubleshooting 
abnormalities caused by the absence of events (i.e., missing events, which are events that 
did not occur). 
In other words, conventional (standard) logging methods merely involve logging 
all generated messages locally and/or with the remote syslog (and/or assurance), which 
creates debugability issues due to the volume of the logs. It is even more difficult when the 
same syslog server is used for multiple WLCs, which is the case with clustering 
deployments where the same global configuration is shared among WLCs of the cluster. 
Bifurcation of specific information about the state and event of the WLCs from these logs 
is particularly problematic. Moreover, these logs do not carry information required for 
troubleshooting abnormalities/issues caused by missing events, or information required for 
tracing and troubleshooting any incidents resulting from attacks. For example, a 
repudiation attack is used to modify the authoring information by the attacker in order to 
log the wrong data to the log files. If this attack takes place, the data stored on the log files 
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can be considered invalid or misleading. Conventional logging methods lack traceability 
and troubleshooting tools even though these are required for complex wireless cluster 
deployments, especially when they are distributed. 
In addition to conventional logging methods, there are also methods such as 
assurance/telemetry whereby a large set of data is captured with a series of events and state 
changes for all the wireless clients along with WLC/AP events. These data are used for 
network analytics that are difficult to trace and troubleshooting abnormalities/issues caused 
by missing events and attacks (e.g., repudiation attacks). 
There are existing signed logging systems that operate using Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) methods. However, these simply enhance authentication and 
trustworthiness of the logged messages without improving the traceability and 
troubleshooting of any issue. In other words, these methods do not simplify debugability. 
Thus, conventional and signed logging method do not incorporate any extra information to 
troubleshoot abnormalities/issues caused by missing events. Moreover, because large 
volumes of data and logs are generated by multiple features, debugging using syslog may 
require an in-depth understanding of WLCs and their features. However, syslog also does 
not provide information to debug issues caused by missing events, and does not help 
identify attacks such as repudiation attacks. 
The latest system design methodologies are driven by data, state change, and 
triggered events. Absence of integrity and validity of information may mislead and create 
an unwanted result. Hence, it is vital to ensure the integrity and validity of the information 
as well as to track how information has been manipulated through its current state. 
Accordingly, in order to minimize the debugability, troubleshoot 
abnormalities/issues, overcome attacks, etc., presented herein are techniques for collecting 
state and event information regarding the WLCs in the cluster along with network events 
(e.g., link and/or port state changes) to enable diagnosing of problems in the wireless 
cluster deployments. This may be accomplished by plotting state changes against state 
machine diagrams, and triggered events against event diagrams. State and event 
information may be securely captured and used to reconstruct/recreate state machines and 
event diagrams (e.g., using Unified Modeling Language (UML)) which may be directly 
mapped to the code. Existing tools may be used to convert state machines and event 
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diagrams to code and vice-versa. These generated state machines and event diagrams may 
help to map/troubleshoot any abnormalities/issues/attacks caused by missing events/flows. 
Thus, the techniques described herein may involve troubleshooting abnormalities/issues in 
the network using states and events before debugging further using syslog/assurance. 
Figure 1 below illustrates an example system configured for traceability and 




Techniques described herein may utilize the concept of provenance. Provenance 
relates to mechanisms for caching state and event information related to the whole system, 
and using that information to track issues whenever problems occur in deployment. 
Provenance may enable tracing and analyzing problems in complex systems and 
determining causes of errors and unwanted behavior. Provenance techniques may thus 
improve traceability and troubleshooting by caching metadata of state changes and events 
of all WLCs in the cluster. Provenance metadata comprises the history of all WLCs in the 
cluster, including network events and state changes of all WLCs in the enterprise wireless 
cluster deployment starting from the beginning state through the current state. All 
information (e.g., creation time, modified time, etc.) is collected as provenance metadata.  
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State change metadata (e.g., for the APs) may include information relating to, or 
statuses such as, booting up, running, active, standby, master capable, leader, worker, 
follower, joined/disjoined to/from WLC, moved to standalone from connected mode, 
start/stop of the running services (e.g., cluster services, load balancing service, mDNS 
service, etc.), etc. Network event metadata may include information relating to WLCs (e.g., 
HA switchover, link up/down, port up/down, stoppage of service, restart of service, 
gateway unreachability, etc.), WLCs in a mobility group (e.g., mobility member 
added/deleted, mobility tunnel up/down, etc.), the cluster (e.g., leader election (consensus 
algorithm among WLCs), worker WLC connected/disconnected to/from the leader WLC, 
leader failover, etc.), or the APs (e.g., Control and Provisioning of Wireless APs 
(CAPWAP) keep-alive messages lost, link up/down, port up/down, etc.). 
There are two main types of provenance metadata: positive provenance metadata 
and negative provenance metadata. Positive provenance metadata ensures the integrity and 
validity of the information as well as how information has been manipulated through its 
current state. This ability to explain state changes and the reason(s) behind those changes 
may enable debugging and diagnosis of various faults. A backtrace may be constructed 
based on the occurrence of an event or state change of an entity and, if required, the event 
or set of events that caused the state change or abnormalities may be recursively identified. 
For example, WLCs may encounter resource and network failures. Hence, 
analyzing provenance metadata may be an important mechanism for detecting network 
failures and monitoring resource malfunctions. Positive provenance metadata may help 
explain the series of actions that led to the change of an object to its current state from that 
of its origin. For example, the change could be due to the data, a state, or an event of the 
WLC in the deployment. Tracking and then analyzing preceding events helps to diagnose 
the actual reason behind the system failure or security breaches. 
Negative provenance metadata uses counterfactual reasoning to identify the 
conditions for which the missing event would have occurred. This also provides a way to 
construct a backtrace (e.g., determining reasons explaining the cause of the missing event). 
The complexity of negative provenance metadata may be greater than that of positive 
provenance metadata. With positive provenance metadata, a specific chain of events that 
led to an observed event is known, whereas with negative provenance metadata, all possible 
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chains of events causing observed event may be considered. In short, positive provenance 
metadata explains why a state or an event changed or occurred, and negative provenance 
explains why a state or an event did not change or occur. 
For example, the absence of events (e.g., discovery requests not reaching a worker 
WLC, unavailable events such as socket descriptor of worker WLC not being added to the 
event loop (evloop), etc.), can be explained by using counterfactual reasoning to identify 
conditions under which these events could have occurred. In order to find a missing or 
negative event in a WLC, all possible positive events may be considered from the WLC 
(Device Under Test (DUT)) and from other WLCs in the cluster that would have resulted 
in the particular missing event. The reason may be deduced from that information. In this 
case, a large chain of events needs to be considered. 
Although negative events cannot be explained directly with positive provenance, 
there is a way to construct a similar backtrace for negative events. Instead of explaining 
how an actual event did occur, as with positive provenance, all the ways in which a missing 
event could have occurred may be determined, and then the root cause for why each of 
them did not come to pass may be shown. In short, counterfactual reasoning may be used 
to recursively generate the explanations, not unlike positive provenance. 
Consider an AP, AP1, that initially connects to a leader WLC, WLC1. WLC1 may 
perform load balancing of AP1 among WLCs in the cluster based on the site tag, RRM 
neighbors or round robin method, and select a worker WLC, WLC2, for AP1 to join. 
Visually, AP1 --> WLC1 --> WLC2 --> load balancing, and AP1 --> WLC2 --> 
Join/Connect. For a CAPWAP discovery request to arrive at WLC2, a request would have 
had to appear at the WLC1, which did not happen. Such a request could only have to come 
from AP1 and eventually from WLC1 to WLC2. However, WLC1 would only have sent 
the request to WLC2 if there had been: (1) an actual CAPWAP discovery request from 
AP1; (2) a load balancing algorithm on WLC1 considers WLC2 as one of the WLC in the 
cluster; (3) a load balancing algorithm on WLC1 selects WLC2 for AP1 to connect; or (4) 
there is communication channel (e.g., tunnel) over User Datagram Protocol (UDP) / 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) between WLC1 
and WLC2. If conditions (1), (2), and (3) were satisfied, but condition (4) was not (because 
the link between WLC1 and WLC2 is not stable and disconnect occurred between the 
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aforementioned events), then it may be determined through positive provenance where the 
communication channel would have been established. Similar techniques are applicable 
for finding missing events using positive provenance. 
Situations may also arise in which a compromised WLC may provide incorrect 
information in the absence of a TPM (e.g., attestation/trustworthiness mechanism). In such 
cases, provenance metadata may be used to track manipulation or tamper-evident 
properties from other WLCs in the cluster to assist the operator/administrator in detecting 
the compromised WLC. Thus, provenance metadata may provide useful information to 
analyze, optimize, and secure any suitable system. 
The wireless cluster deployments are more prominent in virtual deployments which 
utilize virtual WLCs (vWLCs) and cloud  deployments. The hyper ledger of the private 
blockchain may enable use of an authenticated ledger, which is a mandatory requirement 
for enterprise deployments. Blockchains maintain tamper-proof transactions (i.e., once a 
transaction is created on the blockchain, it cannot be modified or deleted). As such, 
blockchains may be used for troubleshooting abnormalities due to attacks (e.g., repudiation 
attacks, etc.). The hyper ledger may also be used to provide authenticated access to the 
ledger based on initial registration. Only state and event changes of the WLCs in the cluster 
are maintained as transactions in the hyper ledger and not the whole syslog. For syslog and 
assurance, existing signed logging system may be used. 
Provenance metadata may be maintained as transactions in the hyper ledger of the 
private blockchain to improve traceability and troubleshooting in complex enterprise 
wireless cluster network deployments. All authenticated WLCs of the cluster may have 
access to the hyper ledger for tracing and troubleshooting network issues at any point in 
time and on any of the WLCs in the cluster. Metadata for the network events may be 
customizable by the configuration based on given requirements, thereby minimizing the 
number of transactions maintained in the hyper ledger. By using the metadata of state 
changes and available events as transactions in the hyper ledger, the state machine diagram 
and event diagram may be reconstructed and used to map to the code. 
For simplicity, only one leader WLC and one worker WLC are considered in the 
following example, but it will be appreciated that these techniques may be extended to a 
larger deployment comprising a cluster of WLCs. The transaction model enhances 
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traceability and troubleshooting by recording all state changes and network events among 
WLCs, which helps in capturing the behavior of the entire network. Within a running 
network, if the network suffers abnormal attacks, the attack process is also logged as a 
transaction. With these logged transactions of attack trajectories, any future attacks 
launched on the network may be identified using attack pattern recognition. For enhancing 
traceability and troubleshooting across WLCs in the cluster, transactions for the WLC 
states (Transaction_STATE) and events (Transaction_EVENT) may be created and added 
to the hyper ledger of the private blockchain. 
Major state changes of the leader WLC, starting from boot-up, may be captured in 
the hyper ledger as transactions ("state provenance"). The state of the leader WLC may be 
defined as STATE_LEADER = (ID_LEADER, ID_state, old_state, new_state, 
SK_LEADER, PK_LEADER). ID_LEADER may represent the identity of the leader 
WLC. ID_state may represent the identity of the state, which is maintained as the 
transaction. old_state may represent the previous state, and new_state may represent the 
current state. SK_LEADER may represent the private (secret) key of the leader WLC, and 
PK_LEADER may represent the public key of the leader WLC. SK_LEADER and 
PK_LEADER may be used for authenticating the information. The corresponding 
transaction may be defined as Transaction_STATE_LEADER = (ID_WLC_LEADER, 
ID_state, STATE_LEADER, SIGNATURE_LEADER). SIGNATURE_LEADER may be 
defined as DS.Signature (SK_LEADER, ID_LEADER, ID_state), and may represent the 
signature of the transaction for the state change by the leader WLC using its private key. 
Major state changes of the worker WLC, starting from boot-up, may be captured in 
the hyper ledger as transactions ("state provenance"). The state of the worker WLC may 
be defined as STATE_WORKER = (ID_WORKER, ID_state, old_state, new_state, 
SK_WORKER, PK_WORKER). ID_WORKER may represent the identity of the worker 
WLC. SK_WORKER may represent the private (secret) key of the worker WLC, and  
PK_WORKER may represent the public key of the worker WLC. SK_WORKER and 
PK_WORKER may be used for authenticating the information. The corresponding 
transaction may be defined as Transaction_STATE_WORKER = (ID_WORKER, ID_state, 
STATE_WORKER, SIGNATURE_WORKER). SIGNATURE_WORKER may be 
9
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 3038 [2020]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3038
 9 5965 
defined as DS.Signature (SK_WORKER, ID_WORKER, ID_state), and may represent the 
signature of the transaction for the state change by the worker WLC using its private key. 
Major events that occurred on the WLCs, starting from the first negotiation, may 
be captured in the hyper ledger as transactions ("event provenance"). These events may be 
customized per configuration. An event that occurred on the leader WLC may be defined 
as EVENT_on_Leader = (ID_LEADER, ID_event, event, SK_LEADER, PK_LEADER). 
The ID_event may represent the identity of the event, which is maintained as a transaction. 
The corresponding transaction may be defined as Transaction_EVENT_on_LEADER = 
(ID_LEADER, ID_event, EVENT_on_LEADER, SIGNATURE_LEADER). 
SIGNATURE_LEADER may represent the signature of the transaction for the event by 
the leader WLC using its private key. Similarly, transactions may be created for events on 
worker WLCs, but signed by the worker WLCs using their private key(s). 
Once transactions have been created for the states and events, they may be added 
to the private blockchain and hence to the hyper ledger. Any of the issues or abnormalities 
may be troubleshot using this transactional information. To ensure integrity and validity, 
the WLCs may use a corresponding verification function to verify the signature added to a 
given transaction by the WLC providing the information to the private blockchain. For 
example, for event validation, the verification function at the leader WLC may be defined 
as VER_EVENT_on_LEADER = DS.Verification(PK_LEADER, 
SIGNATURE_LEADER), and the verification function at the work WLC may be defined 
as VER_EVENT_on_WORKER = DS.Verification(PK_WORKER, 
SIGNATURE_WORKER).  
Similarly, the verification function for validating the leader WLC may be defined 
as VER_LEADER = DS.Verification (PK_LEADER, SIGNATURE_LEADER), and the 
verification function for validating the worker WLC identity may be defined as 
VER_WORKER = DS.Verification (PK_WORKER, SIGNATURE_WORKER). Along 
with traceability and troubleshooting, these transactions may help improve accountability 
by listing out how many events were generated by the leader WLC and the worker WLCs.  
The techniques described herein are applicable in many use cases. In cases where 
enterprise wireless cluster deployments are in a suspicious state and if there are faulty or 
misbehaving WLCs, provenance information can play a vital role to debug and identify 
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them. It may also be used to assess the damages that the faulty WLC might have caused to 
the system. Provenance information can also be used to answer audit questions in order to 
predict future workloads. Based on such predictions, the performance of the system, as 
well as the availability of the service, may be identified. 
The techniques described herein may be extended to WLCs in a mobility group, 
APs, etc., by considering the states and events of APs and WLCs in the mobility group. A 
mobility group may be a group of WLCs that collaborate to provide seamless client 
roaming. The administrator may configure the level of information (e.g., criticality of state 
change, priority of events, etc.) required as per the serviceability required. These 
techniques may be scaled using any suitable mechanisms for blockchain. The use of 
provenance metadata described herein provides periodic auditing for network behaviors 
(e.g., network events associated with resulting network states), which helps to enforce the 
stability and robustness of the enterprise wireless cluster deployment. The traceability and 
troubleshooting for network issues is also improved. Furthermore, attack pattern 
recognition may be incorporated to resist future network attacks based on provenance 
metadata and events. 
In summary, techniques are described herein for enhancing traceability and 
troubleshooting in complex enterprise wireless cluster deployments using provenance 
metadata and a hyper ledger. State and event information are captured and used to 
reconstruct/recreate state machines and event diagrams (e.g., using UML) which may be 
directly mapped to the code. The states and events of all WLCs in the cluster are maintained 
as provenance metadata. Provenance metadata may improve troubleshooting 
abnormalities/issues caused by an event or state change (positive provenance), and may 
help in debugging issues caused by missing events (negative provenance). The metadata is 
maintained as a transaction in the hyper ledger of a private blockchain, which may help in 
troubleshooting incidents caused by attacks (e.g., repudiation attacks, etc.). The transaction 
records are signed by the source to provide authenticity of the information that is especially 
required in the absence of a TPM. 
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